

## The Smart Power of the United States Under the Presidency of Joe Biden: A Case Study on Strategic Competition with China.

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### Abstract

This article analyzes the Biden administration's deployment of smart power - the strategic integration of hard power coercion and soft power attraction within the context of U.S.-China strategic competition from 2021 to 2024. Employing a qualitative case study grounded in Joseph Nye's smart power framework, the research investigates how U.S. foreign policy was structurally recalibrated through mini-lateral alliances, technology decoupling, and the defense of international norms. The findings indicate that the current administration systematically transitioned from the unilateral transactionalism of its predecessor to an institutionalized, alliance-centered smart power strategy. The study elucidates the balance between commanding mechanisms, such as integrated deterrence and supply chain restrictions, and enticing mechanisms, such as climate partnerships and vaccine diplomacy. Ultimately, the paper conceptualizes the enduring organizational constraints on U.S. smart power amid Beijing's counter-hedging strategies and broader systemic transformations.

**Keywords:** *Smart Power; Strategic Competition; Biden Administration; Indo-Pacific Security; Alliance-Centric Diplomacy; Technology Decoupling; Integrated Deterrence.*

### 1. Introduction

In the contemporary multi-conceptual global order, recalibrating national power strategies is a critical imperative for global stability. In the 21st century, the capacity of a superpower to sustain global leadership depends not solely on military primacy or economic scale, but on the deliberate integration of resources to generate smart power. Smart power is defined as the ability to combine the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of attraction and persuasion into effective strategies (Nye, 2011).

The Trump administration adopted a transactional, unilateralist "America First" doctrine, relying primarily on coercive hard power and tariff diplomacy, which inadvertently strained traditional alliances and diminished American soft power capital. Upon assuming office in 2021, President Joe Biden declared that "America is back" and that "diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy" (The White House, 2021). This declaration marked a significant structural transition toward a more sophisticated and institutionalized approach to international relations.

Confronted with an increasingly assertive China seeking to reshape the Indo-Pacific strategic environment, the current administration concluded that neither exclusive containment (hard power) nor unrestrained engagement (soft power) would sufficiently secure American national interests. Consequently, the United States adopted a calculated smart power strategy to address this major geopolitical challenge.

Although scholarship on contemporary U.S.-China relations is expanding, a significant empirical and theoretical gap persists. Much of the existing literature either isolates the military-economic dimensions of strategic competition or focuses exclusively on cultural-ideological narratives, resulting in an under-theorized operational synthesis. This article addresses this gap by posing the following research question: How did the Biden administration structurally integrate and deploy hard and soft power resources to construct an effective smart power strategy against China between 2021 and 2024? By delineating clear case boundaries within this presidential term, the paper demonstrates why the U.S.-China competitive dyad serves as a critical case for evaluating the durability of smart power theory amid renewed great-power rivalry.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Conceptual Models of Smart Power in International Relations

The conceptual foundation of this study is grounded in the evolution of theories of power in modern international relations. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004, 2011) initiated a departure from exclusive reliance upon traditional power metrics, contending in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* and *The Future of Power* that global interdependence entails a strategic integration of both coercive and attractive capabilities. Nye maintains that the United States must effectively operationalize smart power, defined as the strategic combination of hard and soft power, to preserve its global legitimacy and influence in the 21st century.

Vietnamese scholars further develop this conceptualization by examining power dynamics through political and sociological frameworks. Bui Viet Huong (2011) highlights the dialectical relationship between hard power and soft power, arguing that these forms of power reinforce one another rather than operate independently. When included within a smart power framework, they enable international consensus and promote voluntary coordination with national policy objectives. Similarly, Le Ngoc Hung (2017) adopts a political-sociological perspective, asserting that a balanced smart power strategy is important for modern nation-states to design and implement agile, effective foreign policies in an increasingly complex worldwide environment.

### 2.2. Strategic Dynamics of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward China

The exercise of U.S. power has greatly influenced its enduring strategic orientation toward China. U.S. foreign policy is primarily motivated by core national interests, although the ideological approaches to achieving these interests differ. Ian Bremmer (2015) identifies three principal schools of thought shaping Washington's global engagement: independence, pragmatism, and necessity. Do Thi Ngoc Anh (2022) similarly observes that while tactical approaches fluctuate between liberal internationalism and realism, the overarching, bipartisan grand strategy remains the maintenance of U.S. global primacy. In the context of major-power management, Bruce W. Jentleson (2000) frames those strategic choices as a dynamic balance among four foundational pillars: power, peace, prosperity, and principles.

Applied to U.S.-China relations, this grand strategy appears as intensive geopolitical management. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997), in *The Grand Chessboard*, contended that managing a rising China requires a long-term geopolitical vision that incorporates strategic cooperation with Beijing to avoid regional hegemony. More recent scholarship, however, identifies a marked shift toward competitive containment. Nguyen Thai Yen Huong (2017) examines this situation through the structural balance-of-power

framework, demonstrating that the United States remains firmly committed to securing its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific, a region where China actively seeks to broaden its influence.

This tactical friction has intensified in recent years. Le Van My (2020) demonstrates that following the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, U.S. foreign policy has progressively focused on preventing China from surpassing the United States as the world's preeminent power. Le Van My (2022) further links this shift to the formalization of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which serves as an extensive framework for protecting American strategic interests in response to China's expanding regional assertiveness, thereby reshaping the parameters of regional cooperation. Furthermore, domestic factors such as party politics (Hershey, 2017) and entrenched cultural values (Nguyen Thai Yen Huong, 2018) continue to affect the scope, rhetoric, and implementation of these containment tactics.

### **2.3. Biden's Alliance-Based Diplomacy and Smart Power Deployment**

The current U.S. grand strategy under President Joe Biden illustrates a distinct application of smart power, defined by renewed emphasis on multilateralism and alliance-based diplomacy. Le Hai Binh and Nguyen Hoang Duy (2021) note that the Biden administration prioritizes revitalizing traditional alliances and reestablishing Washington's global leadership, with a concerted effort to counter China collectively.

This strategy represents more than a reversion to pre-Trump policies. It is a deliberate initiative to reshape the international order. Do Mai Lan and Vu Phuong Anh (2022), in their analysis of the administration's first year, contend that Biden's diplomacy aims to fundamentally transform the global strategic landscape. By creating institutionalized balances of influence, the administration attempts to optimize strategic strengths for both the United States and its allies, grounding this cooperation in common democratic principles and reciprocal security interests.

### **2.4. Research Gap and Contributions**

Despite extensive scholarship on these three pillars, several significant gaps continue. First, the contemporary and evolving nature of the Biden government has resulted in a shortage of comprehensive, retrospective academic analyses reviewing its foreign policy through a rigorous smart power framework. Strictly speaking, the existing literature conceptualizes smart power in abstract terms and lacks detailed, multidimensional assessments of its actual implementation across the diplomatic, economic, and military domains. Finally, current research on U.S.-China relations often adopts a bifurcated approach, focusing exclusively on structural realpolitik or strategic competition, and thus neglects to assess how alliance-based soft power and traditional hard power are integrated into a unified counter-China strategy.

This article addresses these academic gaps by systematically clarifying the concept of smart power in contemporary international relations and critically evaluating its operationalization by the Biden administration. Using targeted case studies of strategic competition with China, the study illustrates the practical application, essential limitations, and prospective development of modern U.S. smart power.

## **3. Methods**

This study uses a rigorous qualitative case study research design structured around a deductive analytical scheme. The paper conceptualizes the United States as the primary actor, the Biden government (2021-2024) as the temporal boundary, and the strategic competition with China as the critical case study. The data collection and analytical process are governed by the following strict methodologies:

**Source Selection Criteria:** This study uses primary official documents, including The White House readouts, and U.S. Department of State policy declarations. These primary sources are triangulated with secondary academic literature from peer-reviewed international relations journals and reputable strategic research institutions.

**Periodization:** The analytical scope is explicitly bounded between January 20, 2021, and the end of the presidential term in 2024, enabling an extensive review of policy continuity and operational outcomes.

Coding Logic and Analytical System: Hard power indicators are coded as explicit coercive mechanisms, including freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), unilateral technology export controls (e.g., CHIPS and Science Act), and military-industrial alliances (AUKUS). Soft power indicators are coded as mechanisms of voluntary co-optation, such as multilateral vaccine allocations, climate diplomacy engagement, and the defense of democratic norms. Smart power effectiveness is empirically judged by two criteria: the capacity to secure commitments from regional middle powers (allied alignment) and the successful prevention of military escalation while sustaining structural pressure on Beijing (managed competition).

## **4. Findings and Discussion**

### **4.1. The United States' Perception and Structural Re-conceptualization of Smart Power**

Under the Biden presidency, the operating framework of power within U.S. grand strategy underwent a major transition, moving away from the transaction-heavy unilateralism that characterized the previous “America First” doctrine. The administration reconceptualized smart power not as merely adding soft power to hard power assets, but as a fluid, context-dependent synthesis of material deterrence and institutional legitimacy.

This tactical shift was heavily driven by domestic systemic factors. The rapid institutionalization of a highly specialized national security apparatus, made up of veteran technocrats with substantial prior bureaucratic experience, facilitated long-term strategic planning and minimized early transitional policy friction. Furthermore, this bureaucratic consolidation operated within a distinct domestic environment: a resilient, bipartisan consensus within both the legislative and executive branches regarding the systemic geopolitical challenge posed by China. This unified domestic front provided the necessary structural political capital to execute sophisticated economic and legislative instruments.

The administration's grand strategy was anchored in the theoretical recognition that while the United States sustained its structural military and financial primacy, the unilateral application of hard power generates severe counterbalancing behaviors and diminishes the diplomatic capital required to manage intricate international systems. As Joseph Nye posited, hard power resources serve as the structural baseline that can either enhance or constrain the efficacy of soft power attraction. Consequently, the current administration sought to merge American material capabilities with a fresh devotion to multilateralism, international norms, and alliance-building, transforming U.S. posture into an alliance-centric smart power configuration designed to alter the strategic environment surrounding Beijing.

### **4.2. The Practical Operationalization of Smart Power in the U.S.-China Strategic Competition**

#### **4.2.1. Alliance-Centric Diplomacy and the Indo-Pacific Security Architecture**

The hard power dimension of the Biden government's smart power strategy was fundamentally restructured around an alliance-centric model, shifting away from unilateral military projection toward an integrated network of mini-lateral frameworks. This approach did not simply aim to pool material resources but sought to institutionalize a collaborative alignment that validated American forward presence as a legitimate public good in the Indo-Pacific. The operationalization of this strategy is visible in the structural upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the establishment of the AUKUS trilateral security pact in September 2021. Through AUKUS, the United States employed a high-level hard power mechanism; the transfer of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capabilities to Australia while simultaneously exploiting a soft power narrative grounded in the defense of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and the rule of law (Babbage, 2024).

This structural networking effectively transformed the traditional “hub-and-spoke” alliance system into an interconnected matrix. The administration systematically reinforced bilateral commitments with traditional treaty allies, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, while increasing

strategic cooperation with key states in Southeast and South Asia. By synchronizing the U.S. defense posture with its partners' regional security architectures, the administration expanded its tactical access, as demonstrated by the 2023 expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, which granted U.S. forces access to additional strategic military bases (Poling, 2023). This material expansion was consistently accompanied by joint diplomatic declarations affirming observance of international maritime law, thereby neutralizing Beijing's efforts to frame U.S. forward deployment as destabilizing unilateralism.

#### **4.2.2. Technology Decoupling, Supply Chain Resilience, and Economic Statecraft**

In the economic and technological arenas, the current administration abandoned broad tariff warfare in favor of a precision-targeted smart power strategy conceptualized as “de-risking” rather than complete economic decoupling (Capri, 2023). This strategy blended coercive regulatory systems (hard power) with institutional alternatives designed to incentivize regional compliance. The hard power instruments were institutionalized through groundbreaking legislative acts, most notably the CHIPS and Science Act of August 2022, which allocated \$52.7 billion to domestic semiconductor research and manufacturing while imposing strict “guardrails” that prohibit recipients from expanding advanced manufacturing capacity in China (Blevins et al., 2023). This was reinforced by the U.S. Department of Commerce's sweeping export controls on October 7, 2022, which restricted China's access to high-end computing chips, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and American engineering talent (Benson, 2023).

To prevent these coercive controls from triggering economic backlash from regional partners deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains, the administration launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in May 2022 (Cimino-Isaacs et al., 2024), alongside the Blue Dot Network infrastructure certification mechanism (OECD, 2024). Rather than offering traditional market access through tariff reductions, the United States used IPEF to build multilateral commitments across strategic pillars, such as supply chain resilience and digital trade standards. By positioning the United States as a primary architect of universal tech standards, data privacy protocols, and supply chain early-warning systems, the administration created an attractive regulatory environment that incentivized advanced economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to voluntarily realign their technological ecosystems with Western security parameters, thereby systematically diluting Beijing's regional economic statecraft.

#### **4.2.3. Normative Contestation, Public Diplomacy, and Global Governance**

The current administration's approach to global governance is best conceptualized as a strategy of “normative contestation”, a systemic effort to reinforce the legitimacy of the rules-based international order by contrasting transparent, open governance with state-centric alternative models. The government acknowledged that moral authority cannot be sustained through rhetorical declarations alone; it must be backed by the visible provision of global public goods to restore American soft power capital.

This blending of normative leadership and material capability was clearly demonstrated during the dual crises of global public health and climate change. Upon assuming office, the current administration immediately reversed its predecessor's withdrawal from international institutions, formally rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement in February 2021 (Blinken, 2021), and restoring membership in international forums. This institutional return was reinforced by material execution: at the Virtual Global COVID-19 Summit in September 2021, President Biden committed the United States to donating over 1.1 billion vaccine doses globally, primarily via the COVAX facility, without political conditionalities (U.S. Department of State, 2021). By applying its state-of-the-art biomedical infrastructure to lead the global pandemic response, the United States built an effective soft power alternative to China's bilateral “vaccine diplomacy”, showcasing the material efficacy and benevolence of democratic models of governance.

In the arena of strategic communications, the United States maintained a sophisticated position by utilizing its structural placement within global multimedia networks. Rather than executing crude state propaganda, U.S. public diplomacy operated through an open information ecosystem driven by independent media houses, academic institutions, and digital media platforms that organically project

values of open, transparent governance. The administration institutionalized this structural advantage by implementing specific foreign policy models, such as the February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, which focused on funding for regional press freedom, open internet architecture, and cross-border scientific collaboration. Concurrently, the administration utilized targeted legislative reporting systems, such as the Congressional Research Service evaluations and Department of State declarations, to bring global transparency to human rights conditions in Xinjiang and Tibet. By grounding its normative critique within established international legal structures, Washington successfully constructed a broad consensus among liberal democracies, translating normative principles into collective diplomatic constraints on Beijing's behavior.

#### **4.2.4. Maritime Domain Awareness, FONOPs, and Grey-Zone Management**

In managing maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the current administration pursued a deliberate two-pronged smart power approach intended to contain Chinese grey-zone assertiveness while continuing crisis communication lines to stop unintended kinetic escalation. The hard power component involved a disciplined, highly publicized schedule of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) conducted by the U.S. Navy. Crucially, the administration altered the operational narrative of these transits: rather than presenting them as unilateral displays of naval dominance, FONOPs were strictly executed with rigorous lawful justifications, meticulously framed around the defense of freedom of navigation under customary international law as codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This legal framing transformed a military maneuver into a mechanism for enforcing international norms, securing broad diplomatic support from regional coastal states.

This normative framework was systematically integrated with regional capacity development programs. Through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which received billions in annual congressional appropriations under the Biden term (Nicastro, 2024), the United States directly enhanced the maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities of partner nations in Southeast Asia (U.S. Department of State, 2025). This assistance included providing patrol vessels, radar infrastructure, and satellite intelligence sharing to maritime law enforcement agencies in the Philippines and Vietnam. By enabling regional states to autonomously detect and document grey-zone coercion within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), the United States enabled local actors while continuing a calculated degree of strategic distance. This was balanced by sophisticated defense-diplomacy mechanisms, including the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and high-level bilateral summits, making sure that strong structural competition was consistently stabilized by institutional guardrails.

## **5. Assessment and Forecasting**

### **5.1. Strategic Evaluation of the Biden government's Smart Power Architecture**

An objective assessment of the U.S. smart power strategy from 2021 to 2024 reveals a highly adaptive framework that successfully met its core objective: altering the strategic environment surrounding China by reconstructing a favorable balance of power, rather than pursuing the unrealistic goal of forcing internal regime transformation in Beijing. The administration demonstrated high contextual intelligence by executing a calibrated foreign policy that successfully combined commanding mechanisms (integrated deterrence, targeted technological sanctions) with enticing mechanisms (multilateral climate diplomacy, institutional re-engagement). The primary structural success of this strategy rests in the institutionalization of mini-lateral networks, which closed the strategic gaps in the Indo-Pacific theater that Beijing had previously utilized to expand its regional influence.

However, the strategy encountered internal structural contradictions. The main limitation of the Biden government's smart power model was the widening gap between its security commitments and its economic offerings. While the United States achieved deep security integration through frameworks like AUKUS and upgraded bilateral defense guidelines, its domestic political constraints, specifically the rise of protectionist sentiments within the American electorate, prevented the administration from granting comprehensive market access or joining mega-regional trade agreements like the Comprehensive and

Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). By relying on non-binding economic frameworks like IPEF, Washington struggled to fully decouple regional economies from China's massive consumer market and manufacturing supply chains, leaving the soft power dimension of its economic statecraft structurally vulnerable to Beijing's alternative trade initiatives, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

## **5.2. Scenario Forecasting: Geopolitical Trajectories Beyond 2024**

To assess the durability of U.S. smart power amid Beijing's counter-hedging strategies and transforming global dynamics, this study projects three clear structural scenarios based on variations in the power mix (hard vs. soft) and the level of systemic friction.

### **5.2.1. Scenario 1: Intensified Containment and Technological Bloc Bifurcation (High-Friction Realism)**

**Structural Conditions:** This scenario assumes a major intensification in the regional security dilemma, driven by accelerated Chinese military modernization, intensified cross-strait grey-zone pressure on Taiwan, or a domestic political change in Washington toward aggressive economic nationalism. In this model, the U.S. smart power strategy tilts heavily toward coercive hard power.

**Operational Implementation:** The United States expands its "small yard, high fence" technology restrictions into an outright economic blockade, imposing sweeping secondary sanctions on third-party financial institutions that conduct business with Chinese entities. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is transformed as a framework for the forward deployment of intermediate-range strike capabilities across the first and second island chains.

**Systemic Outcome:** The Indo-Pacific architecture experiences rigid structural bifurcation. Regional middle powers, chiefly within ASEAN, are forced into a zero-sum geopolitical alignment. While Washington successfully freezes China's access to next-generation artificial intelligence nodes, it does so at the expense of its regional soft power, as middle powers face severe economic disturbances, fracturing the global trade architecture into competing, isolated techno-political blocs.

### **5.2.2. Scenario 2: Institutionalized Competition and Managed Equilibrium (Status Quo - Highest Probability)**

**Structural Conditions:** This scenario assumes continuity in the structural dynamics observed during the 2021-2024 period. It operates under the assumption that both Washington and Beijing recognize that a direct kinetic conflict would result in mutual systemic collapse, yet neither actor is willing to concede its structural position within the international hierarchy.

**Operational Implementation:** The United States sustains its dual-track smart power model. Hard power deterrence is continuously reinforced through the expansion of mini-lateral security configurations (AUKUS, QUAD, and the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral framework). Concurrently, soft power channels are deliberately insulated from security friction, permitting sustained, selective cooperation on critical global governance challenges.

**Systemic Outcome:** This trajectory establishes a highly institutionalized "managed competition" framework. The United States and China sustain strong, competitive postures within advanced technologies and maritime military positioning, but have not established permanent crisis-management secretariats. Selective cooperation is successfully executed within international frameworks created to manage global climate mitigation targets, regulate cross-border AI safety standards, and coordinate sovereign debt restructuring for developing nations, stabilizing the global system without requiring structural appeasement.

### **5.2.3. Scenario 3: Selective Pragmatic Condominium (Low-Friction Functional Liberalism)**

**Structural Conditions:** This scenario is driven by severe, concurrent domestic shocks in the two superpowers, such as a prolonged fiscal crisis in the United States coupled with an accelerating

demographic and real estate contraction in the PRC, thereby forcing both capitals to prioritize domestic stabilization over systemic regional power projection.

**Operational Implementation:** Washington shifts its smart power mix toward diplomatic co-optation and functional institutionalism. The United States tempers its normative public diplomacy, reducing its focus on ideological contestation and governance models. In return, Beijing agrees to formalize operational constraints on its maritime law enforcement agencies and respect the territorial status quo in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

**Systemic Outcome:** A regional “de-escalation architecture” emerges, characterized by functional, issue-specific governance. The United States de-escalates its technology export controls, replacing unilateral restrictions with a shared multilateral oversight body. This allows for deeply integrated, selective cooperation across green technology supply chains, global health manufacturing networks, and cross-strait economic security. While this scenario readily diminishes the risk of kinetic war, it risks creating a regional superpower condominium that partially dilutes the structural influence of traditional alliances and alters the long-term credibility of American security guarantees in the eyes of regional partners.

## **6. Conclusion**

Inside the intricate and highly competitive domain of 21st century international relations, the United States’ strategy toward China from 2021 to 2024 functions as a definitive template for the operationalization of smart power. By moving away from the transaction-heavy, unilateral hard power of the “America First” doctrine, the current administration successfully formulated a sophisticated grand strategy that synthesized robust material deterrence with institutional and normative legitimacy. To safeguard American national interests and preserve its structural position within the global hierarchy, Washington effectively demonstrated that managing an ascendant competitor requires altering its surrounding strategic environment rather than pursuing unrealistic domestic transformation.

The fundamental academic and empirical contribution of this article reveals that the Biden government’s smart power architecture was historically distinct from both the expansive multilateralism of the Obama era and the coercive economic nationalism of the Trump presidency. While the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” occasionally lacked the coercive material teeth to deter grey-zone revisionism in the South China Sea, and the Trump administration’s tariff warfare inadvertently fractured the very alliance networks required to maintain long-term structural pressure, the current administration synthesized these disparate approaches into a historically distinct paradigm. It weaponized institutional multilateralism and values-based mini-lateral networks (AUKUS, QUAD) to serve as force multipliers for hard power *răn đe*. Concurrently, by balancing precision-targeted technology controls (“de-risking”) with the global provision of public goods, such as climate governance re-engagement and vaccine distribution via COVAX, Washington successfully restored American moral authority while systematically constraining Beijing’s geopolitical options.

Ultimately, this study finds that smart power is not a static aggregate of resources, but a changing, context-dependent capability that requires continuous structural adaptation. While the current administration successfully stabilized the regional order through an institutionalized framework of “managed competition,” the enduring sustainability of American hegemony faces internal and external constraints. Domestically, the rise of protectionist sentiments limits Washington’s capacity to extend comprehensive market access to regional partners, leaving its economic statecraft vulnerable to alternative regional trade frameworks. Internationally, as the global system shifts deeper into multipolarity, the durability of U.S. power will depend entirely on its capacity to sustain a calibrated equilibrium between hard material deterrence and soft normative attraction. Future research should continue to evaluate how these structural contradictions evolve as the U.S.-China competitive dyad moves beyond 2024.

## Declarations

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## Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.


## Data Availability

The data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

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